

concentration camps, just as the execution of hostages and prisoners of war or just as any other kind of war crime committed by the Italian occupational authorities, so these Italian courts — termed "Roman Justice" in their pretentious phraseology — served one and the same end.

These courts not only lacked the ethical essence of jurisdiction but they also lacked international legal basis for their existence — in other words, they lacked legality. They were indeed sinister horror-chambers in which judicial murders were committed *ex professo*. These courts alone made a considerable contribution to the appallingly high number of war crimes committed by the forces of occupation in Yugoslavia.

The final judgment on the Italian occupational courts in Yugoslavia was passed by the United Nations War Crimes Commission which at Yugoslavia's request has already registered a large number of judges of these courts as war criminals.

IV. THE TAKING AND KILLING OF HOSTAGES

The Italian Royal Army made systematic practice of taking and killing hostages in the occupied territory — while in the "annexed" territory it was assisted in this work by the Italian civil authorities. Prisons and concentration camps were therefore always full of people condemned to death without trial, awaiting in suspense the day of their execution. If the bloodthirsty enemy chose to take victims from the people who were not in prisons and camps, he searched for them in fields and workshops; innocent men were brutally wrenched from their families to be killed without knowing why.

The taking of hostages as a means of warfare has been censured long ago by all civilized peoples. The killing of hostages has been censured long ago as inhuman. But it was just because it was inhuman and criminal that the Italian invaders practised it. They decimated the people of the occupied territory, tried to frighten them to death, to crush their soul and enslave them or force them to emigrate — and all this was done within the framework of the general plan of extermination aimed at making this land an easy spoil.

From the large amount of evidence that has been gathered, we shall cite only characteristic examples of orders, that were issued and executed, basing our proofs exclusively on original Italian documents, so as to illustrate how widespread was this crime and how callous were the criminals.

Before general Mario Roatta took the post of commander of the Second Army, hostages were killed sporadically. By Roatta's order "Circolare 3 C" of March 1, 1942, this crime was rendered systematic and extended throughout the Italian zone of occupation, except Montenegro, where the same system was introduced earlier by general Alessandro Pirzio Biroli. Roatta was then sent from Rome by the Italian Government and the Supreme Command to introduce a more vigorous course of policy. Roatta gave the following order in his circular (p. 34):



A group of hostages at Nevesinje, Herzegovina, shot by the Italians on July 12, 1942.



The same group after the execution.

„..... as a rule hostages should be taken from among the people suspected of sympathising with the Movement of National Liberation, but if need be, other people may be taken as well. Attention should be paid to taking hostages from all social strata of the population. These hostages are responsible with their lives for all attacks on Italian soldiers, committed in places where these hostages are taken, in case of the perpetrators not being caught”.

For the execution of the order quoted in this circular the Italian military commands of the XI Army Corps issued a large number of general instructions relating to its application and separate orders concerning its execution. Before every military action of greater importance, territorial commanders were reminded to apply this barbarious procedure as much as possible.

From the great number of these orders, captured by our authorities together with a part of the archives of the XI Army Corps, we shall quote the following: the order of General Alessandro Maccario, commander of the „Isonzo” division — No. 02/1537, of March 1942:

„..... hostages should be taken from among the insurgents’ families, or such as are intentionally or even unintentionally assisting the partisans or are suspected of it”

The proclamation of Robotti — Commander of the XI Army Corps, and of Grazioli — High Commissioner of the Ljubljana Province, of April 23, and May 6, 1942, announced that:

„..... a corresponding number of hostages will be shot for every case of attack or sabotage if the perpetrators are not caught within 48 hours”

In consequence of these instructions and separate orders, a great number of hostages was shot on the territory of the XI Army Corps. According to public announcements to the people regarding the shooting of hostages, 103 hostages were shot in the city of Ljubljana between April 24, and July 24, 1942, i. e. during three months; during that time more than 300 were shot in the part of Slovenia occupied by Italy. According to evidence that, although incomplete, has been established without any doubt, the total number of hostages amounted to more than 200 in Ljubljana and to more than 1000 in the whole of Ljubljana province. 24 hostages were shot in Ljubljana as a retaliation for the murder of the traitor Dr. Marko Natlačen, who personally went to Mussolini on June 6, 1941 and acknowledged the fact of annexation of a part of Slovenia. (The Proclamation of October 13, 1942).

On the territory of the V, VI and XVIII Army Corps, owing to wide powers given to the chiefs of the civil authority and to the fact that criminal types like Bastianini, Giunta, Testa, Scasselati, Barbera and Zerbino stood at its head, civil authorities took the main part in the execution of these crimes.

Bastianini’s order No. 150 of June 7, 1942 proclaimed all partisan families hostages, forbade their leaving their places of abode and at the same time empowered the police authorities to shoot such persons in case of their breaking this order. Village chief and notable peasants, who were driven to accept the responsibility of watching public order, were also proclaimed a kind of hostages, if owing to their negligence sabotage should occur in their neighbourhood. They could be

RESERVOIR

18 APRILE 1943 XVI Ore

DA SUPERSLODA OPERAZIONI

AT SUPERSERCITO OPERAZIONI

11/95

NR. 0250 DI PROT. (.) NOVITA' AT TUTTO IL 17 APRILE 1943 XXI (.)SETTORE UNDICESIMO CARM (.)

IN AZIONI RASTRELLAMENTO AT BREVE RAGGIO PER PARTE TRUPPE VARI PRESIDI (,) DISPERSI NUCLEI RIBELLI ET DISTRUTTI APPRESTAMENTI LOGISTICI (:) 9 PARTIGIANI UCCISI (,) 9 FERITI (,) 2 CATTURATI ET 1 COSTITUITOSI (:) CATTURATO 2 FUC.MITR. (,) FUCILI (,) MUNIZIONI ET MATERIALE VARIO (.) FERROVIE (.) IN ZONA NOVO MESTO (,) INTERRUZIONE AT LINEA FERROVIARIA PER SCOPPIO MINA (:) EFFETTUATO RIATTAMENTO IN GIORNATA (.) INTERRUZIONE (,) PER ROVESCIMENTO CAMPATE (,) IN ZONA METLIKA (:) IN CORSO LAVORI RIPRISTINO (.)

SETTORE QUINTO CARM (.) RASTRELLAMENTI IN ZONE CASTUA (,) BRINJE ET OGULIN (:) DISPERSI NUCLEI RIBELLI (.) AZIONE IN ZONA STARI GRAD-TRIBANJ (,) DI CUI BOLLETTINO 0194 IERI (,) SI SVOLGE SENZA INCONTRARE RESISTENZA AVVERSARIO (.) TRA BRUSANE ET OSTARJE (,) ATTACCO PARTIGIANI AT AUTOCOLONNA CROATA PROVENIENTE GOSPIC (,) CHE SUBIVA 1 FERITO ET 2 DISPERSI (:) 2 AUTOCARRI INCENDIATI (.) AVIAZIONE (.) ATTIVITA' DI RICOGNIZIONE IN VARIE ZONE (.)

SETTORE DICOTTESIMO CARM (.)

ATTIVITA' PATTUGLIAMENTO ET RASTRELLAMENTO IN VARIE ZONE (:) 3 PARTIGIANI UCCISI (,) 2 CATTURATI ET 3 COSTITUITISI (.) GIORNO 16 CORREME (,) PER RAIPRESAGLIA AT CATTURAM NOSTRO UFFICIALE MEDICO (,) DI CUI BOLLETTINO 0060 DEL 15 CORREME (,) D'ORDINE AUTORITA' CIVILI LE FUCILATI 4 OSTAGGI (:) NOTTE SUL 17 (,) UFFICIALE PREDETTO VENIVA RESTITUITO AT PRESIDIO POSTIRE (I.BRAZZA) (.) AT SPALATO (,) SCONOSCIUTO LANCIAVA DUE BOMBE CONTRO NOSTRO UFFICIALE CHE RIMANEVA ILLESSO ET REAGIVA AT COLPI PISTOLA (.)

..//..

A daily report of the Supersloda (the Second Army) dated April 17, 1943: "As a reprisal for the capture of a physician, an officer of ours, 4 hostages were shot on 16 inst. The physician in question was returned to our garrison at Postire on 17 inst".



Shooting of first hostages in Slovenia, at the village of Radakova Vas.



Shooting of hostages in Slovenia.

No. 2796 di prot.

Il Prefetto della Provincia del Carnaro

**in virtù dei poteri conferitigli del R. D. Legge
18-V-1931 - XIX n. 452 per i Territori Aggregati alla
Provincia di Fiume**

Rende noto che

Appartenenti a famiglie di Jelenie si sono in questi ultimi tempi allontanati dalle loro abitazioni per raggiungere nei boschi i ribelli ed arruolarsi per commettere azioni di banditismo, ladronerie e terrorismo, con uccisioni e rapine di soldati isolati e lavoratori delle terre annesse.

Si informano le popolazioni dei territori annessi che con provvedimento odierno sono stati internati i componenti delle suddette famiglie, sono state rase al suolo le loro case, confiscati i beni e fucilati 20 componenti di dette famiglie estratti a sorte, per rappresaglia contro gli atti criminali da parte dei ribelli che turbano le laboriose popolazioni di questi territori.

Qualora gli appartenenti alle suddette famiglie che si sono dati al bosco, dovessero continuare nella loro attività di banditi e rapinatori, sarà continuata inesorabilmente la rappresaglia.

Fiume, 30 maggio 1942 - XX

Il PREFETTO

TESTA

Testa - 1942 - 1950

Temistocle Testa, Prefect of the province of Quarnero, announces to the population the shooting of 20 hostages, internment of families of the persons who had joined the partisans and destruction of their houses.

shot by every corporal (carabiniere appuntato). We should remark that this acceptance of obligation to watch public order was not voluntary: according to Art. 4 of the cited order, food supplies for an entire region were held up as long as village chiefs and eight other notable persons would not present themselves to the Italian authorities and accept that obligation.

Several days after the issuing of that order, Bastianini commanded a separate concentration camp at the island of Vis for such persons as were considered hostages according to Art. 2 of the same order. This decision bears No. 0625 of June 13, 1942 and begins as follows:

»... For the housing of families of persons who have joined the insurgents, and who shall be removed from the places of their permanent abode to be kept as hostages, it is proposed to erect 8 barracks, at the island of Vis, able to house 1000 persons...«

Bastianini soon realized that this camp would be too small and ordered another one to be erected at Molat, which could receive a much greater number of people — about 3.500. The inhabitants of the province of Zadar were mainly sent to that camp.


Zerbino, Prefect of the province of Split, felt the need for a separate camp for hostages — as the prisons of his province were too small to receive the necessary number of new prisoners to be taken as hostages. A dispatch on that matter, Nr. 10. 7364 Dev. Gab. of May 12, 1943, sent to the Governor of Dalmatia runs as follows:

»... On the other hand, the need of taking hostages is felt more and more, considering the critical moments of the time we live in and in view of the fact that there is no other more suitable weapon to bridle the elements intent upon unrest.

»In consequence of this, and since the prisons of this province are insufficient to receive the great number of hostages that have to be taken as soon as possible, there is an urgent need to erect a concentration camp at a suitable place at the island of Ciovo, between Split and Trogir...«

As can be seen from the orders quoted above and the measures taken, the number of hostages in Dalmatia was enormous. Among the documents of a part of the archives of the Governor of Dalmatia, which fell into our hands, we find a great number of reports of the Italian authorities on shooting of hostages; space does not allow us to quote even a small number of these documents. We shall therefore quote as examples only the reports on the shooting of hostages at Šibenik and its nearest environs from April 23, till June 15, 1943 — i. e. for less than two months, — as well as the correspondence relating to the shooting of these hostages.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gualtierio Sestilli — commander of the Šibenik group of carabinieri, informs the municipal commissar at Šibenik about the number of the people shot "in retaliation", in his report No. 61/105 of June 17, 1943. According to this report 6 people were shot at Konjevratı on April 23, 4 people at Lozovac on April 23, 8 people at Gatari on April 24, 8 people at Konjevratı on May 7, 2 people at Primošten on May 25, 39 people at Mandalini on June 9, 4 people at Konjevratı on June 15. Thus in only a few villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Šibenik, 69 people were shot in less than two months. During the same period 240 hostages were shot in the whole district of Šibenik.



The order of Giuseppe Bastianini, Governor of Dalmatia, of June 7, 1942, on shooting of partisans, taking of hostages etc.



Governo della Dalmazia

ne del funzionario di P.S. o dell'Ufficiale dei CC.RR. competenti.

I beni degli iscritti verranno, con provvedimento del Prefetto, confiscati; quanto ai beni mobili, essi saranno venduti al miglior offerente, e il ricavo sarà assegnato al Comune di residenza perchè lo destini all'E.C.A.; la stessa destinazione sarà data ai beni immobili.

Art. 3°

Chiunque intenda allontanarsi dal luogo di residenza dovrà ottenere un salvacondotto dal più vicino Ufficio di P.S. o Comando dei CC.RR.

I capivilla sono, sotto la loro personale responsabilità, autorizzati a rilasciare permessi per il tempo strettamente necessario per raggiungere l'Ufficio di P.S. o il Comando dei CC.RR.

L'Ufficio di P.S., il Comando dei CC.RR. e i capivilla terranno in apposito registro elencati in numero progressivo i salvacondotti e i permessi rilasciati.

Chiunque sarà trovato senza salvacondotto o permesso di transito fuori del luogo di residenza o non ottempera alle prescrizioni del salvacondotto o del permesso di transito sarà immediatamente arrestato e potrà essere, su ordine del Funzionario di P.S. o dell'Ufficiale dei CC.RR. competenti, senz'altro passato per le armi.

Art. 4°

Non verrà effettuata alcuna distribuzione di viveri ai villaggi compresi tra Obrovazzo, Zegar, Macropolje, Pagene, Chistagne, Modrino Selo, Parcje, Zelengrad, Zupanje, fino a quando i rispettivi

./.



Governo della Dalmazia

Dir. M. P. V. I. N. Z. S. S. S.
okup. i. p. h. o. v. n. p. a. m. a. g. a. t. a.
inv. br. 1269.

3°)

Capovilla insieme con almeno otto abitanti del luogo non si saranno presentati al Commissario al Comune di Obrovazzo o Chistagne per assumere, alla presenza di costoro, del Funzionario di P.S., del Comandante dei CC.RR. e del Comandante del Presidio Locale impegno di:

a) tenersi ad ogni momento a disposizione dell'Autorità civile e militare, per contribuire alla difesa dell'ordine pubblico, delle case, dei beni e dei cittadini;

b) contribuire, agli ordini dei CC.RR., alla ricerca, alla identificazione e al fermo degli iscritti nelle liste e degli autori di atti criminali, nonché alla ricerca di gente armata nel territorio limitrofo.

La somministrazione dei viveri sarà altresì immediatamente so spesa agli abitanti delle zone dove si verificchino atti criminali, come taglio di pali telefonici e telegrafici, lancio di esplosivi, aggressioni a mano armata.

Art. 5°

Qualora si verificchino atti criminali del genere di quelli previsti dall'articolo precedente e risulti accertato che essi siano la conseguenza di colpevole negligenza da parte dei capivilla e degli abitanti che hanno assunto impegno di collaborare per la tutela dell'ordine pubblico, quelli di costoro che siano responsabili potranno, su ordine del Funzionario di P.S. o dell'Ufficiale dei CC.RR. competenti, essere senz'altro passati per le armi.

Saranno, in ogni caso, passati per le armi, sempre su ordine



Drž. komisija za uvr. ziv.
ekup. Ljiljinih pomagaca
Izv. br. 1269

40)

Governo della Patmarzia

della Autorità suindicate, coloro che prestino assistenza, aiuto o in qualsiasi modo favoriscano l'azione dei ribelli.

Art. 6^o

Coloro che entro il 22 giugno corrente rientreranno nella fra-
zione dalla quale si sono allontanati e si presenteranno sottometten-
dosi alle Forze di Polizia locali, salvo che non siano direttamente
e personalmente autori di altri reati, saranno esenti da pena per il
reato di partecipazione o di organizzazione a bande armate, e saranno,
altresi, esenti dalle sanzioni previste dall'art. 2 della presente Or-
dinanza.

Art. 70

La presente Ordinanza, pubblicata per affissione, entra immediatamente in vigore.

Dalla Residenza del Governatore
Zara, li 7 giugno 1942-XX

Wm. L. Garrison

N^o 19.7264

Div. Gab.

SPALATO, 12 maggio 1943. XXI 99420X

OGGETTO: Ostaggi

GOVERNINO DELLA ...

AL GOVERNO DELLA DALLASIA

2 A 7 A

Per porre in atto le misure di integrazione, rese necessarie dalla delicata situazione politica di questa Provincia, occorre, fra l'altro, di poter disporre di un certo numero di ostaggi.

5/14) Come è noto, i numerosi ostaggi catturati nei mesi scorsi, sono stati rilasciati, in ottemperanza alle disposizioni di cotesto Governo mentre alcuni di essi, recuperati della sorte che una volta o l'altra sarebbe loro capitata, si sono resi irreperibili.

D'altra parte la necessità di avere degli ostaggi si fa sempre più sentire, dato il momento critico che attraversiamo e tenuto presente che non vi è altro mezzo più idoneo per tenere a freno gli elementi sovversivi.

12. Per quanto sopra esposto e nella considerazione che le carceri esistenti in questa Provincia non sono affatto sufficienti per accogliere tutti i detenuti, occorre riprendere al più presto, si deve, l'opera di ampliamento in un caso di concentramento, in località adatta, vale la pena di fare un'opera di ampliamento e di...

2. Per tali far conoscere le determinazioni di cui l'ente deve al
comando, affinché possa provvedere all'approvazione del relativo
progetto di bilancio e alla preventiva superiore approvazione, anche
ai fini del finanziamento dei lavori e mantenimento successivo degli
ostacoli.

GOVERNIO DELLA DINAMIZIA
CARPINO
A 10/12/2011
N° di Post. 26936

IL PREFETTO
(Zerbino)

Dr. Paolo Zerbino, Prefect of the province of Split, asks authorization from the Governor of Dalmatia to erect a new concentration camp at the Island of Ciovo, in order "to be able to dispose of a certain number of hostages... as the need for them is being felt more and more"

We shall quote here two examples to illustrate the manner in which some people were shot and in which the "choice" of hostages was made. Both events took place in May 1943 on the occasion of shooting the hostages alluded to in the above cited report of Šibenik.

On May 7 of that year, 8 hostages had to be shot at Konjevrat. When Marko Čogelja was called, he said he was not the man in question as his father's name was Šime, whereas the other one's was Ante, though they both had the same name and surname. The Italian lieutenant scrutinized the list of the people who had to be shot and established the truth of it, but he only waved his hand, struck off the name »di Antonio« with his pencil and wrote down »di Simeone« instead, and ordered the unfortunate man to be shot.

66 hostages were to be shot by order of Prefect Barbera, dated May 19, 1943, No. Gab. No. 1350/3. On the list of those who had to be shot there were people whom a special tribunal had acquitted of responsibility some days before. Major Piero Morglia, special secretary of the prefect, proposed to General Brancati in his private letter of May 20, that 35 persons from the environs of Šibenik, "whom it would be good to eliminate because of their political attitude", should be shot instead of those on the list. Giunta, the new Governor of Dalmatia, who was in Rome at that time, took a special interest in this mass shooting. He telephoned from Rome that "everything should be prepared for shooting", leaving the issue of final orders until his return to his post.

Šibenik and its district stood under the Zadar Prefecture, the post being occupied by the ill-famed General Gaspero Barbera since the second half of 1942. He could be proud of his criminal ingenuity unusual even for the ferocious Italian invader: every telephone post and wire were paid in human lives. According to his order which was broadcast in leaflet form among the people from planes in May 1943, 3 hostages had to be shot on the spot for every telegraph post that was pulled down. The number of hostages could be increased not only in proportion to the posts that were pulled down, but also in proportion to the wire cut down and the amount of damage inflicted. General Brancati, Commissary of the district of Šibenik, to whom this order was forwarded under the Prefecture No. 1680 of May 7, 1943, enthusiastically wrote on it: »Finalmente! (finally)«.

For further illustration of the conditions existing in the district of the Zadar Prefecture, we shall quote here three orders of Prefect Barbera, relating to the shooting of hostages. The first is the circular letter directed to all civil and military authorities of his prefecture on April 28, 1943 under No. 1350. Here is an extract:

»... In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I deem it useful to state once for all the procedure to be applied by the commissaries of the Prefecture in executing death sentences on hostages as a measure of retaliation:

»1) As soon as this Prefecture receives an official report from a carabinieri or from the commissary of the Prefecture relating to any act against the Italians or against the natives devoted to us (give general particulars, age, the circumstances in which the murder was committed and the place of the crime) this office will issue to the competent authority and to the commissary in whose territory the murder has been committed the following telegraphic order:

4*



Prefettura di Zara

P.S. *Sub* 1-07371

Risposta a nota
Allegati

194-1

26 GIU 1943

GOVERNO DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA

OGGETTO: Plotone di militari assalito dai partigiani tra Perkovic e Dubar -

AL MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO,
DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA P.S.
ROMA A.G.A.

e.p.c. AL GOVERNO DELLA REPUBBLICA
Gabinetto

2 A 1

Con riferimento alla prefettuale di numero dell'8.6.1943, relativa all'uccisione di 40 militari in servizio di vigilanza nella linea ferroviaria Sebenico - Perkovic, si comunica che in data 9 corrente sono stati facilitati per rappresaglia quaranta ostaggi. Nessun incidente.

IL PREFETTO
(Gen. Gaspero Barbera)

[Signature]

Report of General Gaspero Barbera, Prefect of Zadar, to the Italian Ministry of the Interior on the shooting of 40 hostages at Šibenik, on June 9, 1943.

570 br. 1740 (Isp. G. R. Z. br. 6.)

URGENTE



R. Prefettura di Zara

Divisione Gab. *Ad. pol.* 1350/3

Proposta a nota

OGGETTO
Ostaggi.-

Legato

Allegati

Sia immediatamente, con adunate pubbliche e a mezzo dei parroci, portata a conoscenza della popolazione del territorio annesso della Provincia di Zara, che da oggi gli elementi di sesso maschile dell'età da 21 a 50 anni, internati a Molat, perchè parenti di latitanti, saranno considerati come ostaggi per gli atti di ritorsione agli omicidi ed agli atti di sabotaggio compiuti da ribelli in questa Provincia.

La R. Questura provveda con assoluta urgenza, d'accordo col Direttore del Campo di Concentramento di Molat, a redigere un apposito elenco nominativo degli internati rientranti nelle condizioni di cui sopra, con le generalità complete, con la località di provenienza ed il loro grado di parentela col latitante.

Tale elenco dovrà essere aggiornato rigorosamente settimanalmente, rimettendone copia al Gabinetto di questa R. Prefettura.

Assicurato.

IL PREFETTO
(Gen. Gaspero Barbera)

[Signature]

Dr. Komisija za ugov. zloc.
okup. i njimov. pomagala
inv. br. 3637

(21)


74)

General Gaspero Barbera, Prefect of Zadar, communicates the following to the prefecture commissaries, questurini, the Governor of Dalmatia, military commands and the commander of the concentration camp at Molat:

"The population of the annexed territory of the province of Zadar should be informed at public meetings and by priests that, beginning from today, all men of 21-50 years of age, interned at Molat as relatives of the rebels, will be considered hostages for murders and cases of sabotage committed by the rebels in this region".

In connection with this, he ordered lists of hostages containing personal data to be made and sent to him each week.

Mass shootings were executed by the Italians in their zone of occupation. The picture shows mass shooting at Gracac.



Shooting of hostages at Šibenik, Dalmatia.



»Apply order No. 1350 (Gab. of April 28, 1943) to... (follow the names of hostages)... who will be shot... on the day... at... hours... at the place... Acknowledge the receipt of this by telegram. Prefect Barbera.

»The carabinieri will take care that the selected persons, who live interned at Molat, should be brought in time to the place designed for execution and handed on to the commander of the detachment designed to execute the shooting. Should, however, there not be as many hostages as required at Molat, the carabinieri will choose them from among the persons coming into consideration and will supply their full particulars and see to it that they are all brought to the place of execution at the same time and in the manner stated above.

»4) The commissary must be present at the execution and also order the population of the place at which the shooting is to take place to attend it; on that occasion he should explain in suitable terms this harsh measure, undertaken for the purpose of retaliation. Besides, the commissary shall make known to the population that the property, both live and dead stock, of the families of the persons who join the insurgents, will be confiscated.

»Finally, the commissary shall inform me by telegram of the execution and send me subsequently a detailed account on the matter«.

The second document contains the order for shooting 66 hostages, already mentioned above; the document was circulated to all the interested persons. The following is an extract:

Nr. 1350/3, May 19, 1943.

...»On the night of 16 inst. the partisans pulled down the telegraph posts along the Šibenik — Split railway track.

»I order therefore that 66 hostages be shot in retaliation. The shooting will be executed on May 22, 1943 along the Vrpolje — Perković railway track in the prescribed manner, in four groups...

»The names of the persons to be shot will be sent in a separate dispatch...

»I attach great importance to such measures of retaliation and they should therefore be applied in the strictest and the most complete manner«.

The third document bears the same Number, Gab. No. 1350 of June 21, 1943, and was directed mainly to communal commissaries. Barbera reproaches them for not properly carrying out his order regarding the presence of the population at the shooting of hostages. It runs as follows:

...»The circular letter of the same number ordered the commissaries to gather the population at the place of shooting and to explain in suitable words the measures of retaliation to be taken.

»It appears, however, that the population of the places designed for shooting does not always attend, which is due also to the execution beginning immediately after the arrival of motor columns on the spot, besides,

Zadar 21 Giugno 1943 *ed. XXI*



R. Prefettura di Zara

Divisione Gab. *N. di ord.* 1330

Proposta a via

- COMMISSARIO DISTRETTUALE - SIBENICO
- COMMISSARI PREFETTIZI DELLA PROVINCIA

e p.c.

- ZARA
- ZARA
- SIBENICO

OGGETTO **Misure di ritorsione per atti di ferocia delittuosa commessa dai ribelli.**

Allegato

Con la circolare pari numero ed oggetto del 28 aprile u.s. è prescritto che i Commissari Prefettizi devono riunire sul posto della esecuzione la popolazione locale, alla quale deve essere opportunamente commentato il provvedimento preso a scopo di ritorsione.

Viceversa si sta verificando che nelle località prescelte per le esecuzioni - quasi tutte deserte - non sempre è presente la popolazione e, anche perché si dà inizio all'operazione non appena le autocolonne arrivano sul posto; inoltre l'arrivo del fucilatore e la successiva traduzione sul luogo dell'esecuzione vengono effettuati nel modo meno appariscente; per ultimo, subito dopo la fucilazione, appositi incaricati provvedono all'immediato seppellimento dei cadaveri, cosicché della grave misura di ritorsione solo qualche elemento se ne accorge ed in modo impreciso, ignorando tra l'altro chi sono i giustiziati.

Per queste ragioni il provvedimento perde la maggior parte del proprio valore al quale vorrebbe tendere.

Richiamo l'attenzione dei Commissari Prefettizi perché sia data una intelligente divulgazione della notizia dei provvedimenti presi senza tuttavia eccedere.

Assicurate.

IL GOVERNATORE
(Gen. Gaspero Barbera)

COMUNE DI OLTRE (ZARA)

Gasparo Barbera

Melli

3

General Gaspero Barbera, Prefect of Zadar, informs the county commissary of Šibenik and the prefecture commissaries that his former circular, ordering the gathering of population at the place of execution, is not fully carried out, as the shooting is being executed too quickly and too inconspicuously and the corpses are buried too quickly. "For that reason" — says the general — "the measure loses its value".

the arrival of hostages and their transport to the place of execution is not carried out in a manner sufficiently conspicuous; finally, the organs designed to bury the corpses do so immediately after the shooting, so that we do not take profit from all the elements of this measure of retortion, and not sufficiently ...»

The same system was introduced as a general rule in Montenegro, which was occupied by the troops of the XIV Army Corps i. e. under Governor General Przio Biroli. Under Nr. 8262, July 1941 he gave the following order:

»... Hostages should be taken from the places in the zone of operations and they should be frequently replaced by others, so that the whole population be exposed to the risk of eventual reprisals«.

At the beginning of January 1942, this measure was sharpened still more, as can be seen in the "Plevaljski Vesnik", organ of the "Pusteria" division, No. 9 of January 12, 1942, which published the following order:

»... the Governor of Montenegro has decided: in case of an attack against a person belonging to the Italian armed forces: 1) 50 (fifty civilians) will be shot for every wounded or killed Italian officer«.

2) 10 civilians will be shot for each N.C.O. or soldier of the Italian army killed or wounded.

»Glas Crnogorca« (No. 15 of April 19, 1942) proclaims the following order under the title: "Communications of the Governorship of Montenegro".

...»His Excellency the Governor has ordered immediate measures of reprisals to be taken, consisting of shooting the elements proved to be of communist inclination, who are now in the hands of our military authorities as hostages«.

This communication contained in fact an order for shooting all the patriots, all the persons, regardless of their sex and age, who were devoted to the struggle of National Liberation and the national resistance of their people; while the term «communist» served only as a mask for further perpetration of crimes. Its aim was to separate the people from their first fighters and thus bring about their complete extermination.

Panicucci Gino, an Italian captain who was taken prisoner, in his examination on October 4, 1944, declared the following:

...»We were ordered to call all those who fought against us communists. This was in force as late as August 1942 when we were given another order by which they were to be called partisans«.

Separate order for shooting hostages came also from the highest authorities. This is proved by the press communications on the execution of shootings, by the written statements of the Italian officers who were prisoners and by the reports of the nearest relations of shot hostages and the declarations of witnesses. We shall quote a few examples only.

NOTIZIARIO DI PLJEVLJE

FOGLIO SETTIMANALE A CURA DELL'UFFICIO "D., DIV. "PUSTERIA."

LUNEDÌ
12 GENNAIO
1942-XX

N. 9

LA PROPAGANDA COMUNISTA

A quali miseri ed infelici momenti ricorra la propaganda comunista! Presto delto: vittorie inglesi, rinvicita russa, intervento dell'America nel conflitto.

La serietà delle nazioni dell'Asse in materia bellica ci dispenserebbe dallo spendere parole per sfatare illusioni semplicemente fantastiche e per svuotare del loro contenuto di menzogne i rigonfi palloni di una insulsa propaganda: invero solo i fatti parlano il loro crudo linguaggio e nella loro eloquenza meritano di essere conosciuti.

Vittorie inglesi. Senza parlare delle... distate inglesi nel Pacifico, delle continue perdite di naviglio da guerra e mercantile nell'Atlantico e nel Mediterraneo, dello sbarco recentemente tentato sulle coste della Norvegia e miseramente fallito, si sa che l'intero impero inglese ha prodotto in Marmarica il massimo suo sforzo, concentrando tutte le sue forze migliori in uomini e mezzi, per schiacciare definitivamente la potenza militare italiana. La battaglia iniziata il 19 Novembre, e che a detta di Churchill doveva risolversi in 2 ore, e' a tutt'oggi 12 Gennaio in pieno svolgimento. L'anglimeria, non che scacciare gli italiani dalla Libia, ha seminato di decine di migliaia di morti l'insospitato terreno, e centinaia e centinaia di carri armati, di cannoni, di aerei, e migliaia di prigionieri sono il tangibile risultato dell'immane sforzo: 2 navi porta-aerei, 2 aerei da battaglia, 6 incrociatori, 4 cacciatorpediniere, numerosi piroscafi, senza contare le molte navi irreparabilmente danneggiate, segnano il fallimento del megalomane sogno di Churchill.

Rinvicita russa. Con le truppe tedesche assediando Pietroburgo e Sebastopoli, e stringenti Mosca in una morsa d'acciaio, il pazzo despota di un popolo di schiavi gioca le ultime sue carte gettando nella fornace divisioni su divisioni, fatte affluire in tutta fretta anche dal lontano estremo Oriente. I tedeschi non flettono la loro linea: i grandi centri industriali, l'Ucraina granaio d'Europa, sono in loro saldo possesso: sulla sterminata pianura di neve i russi pagano con il sangue il piano criminale di Stalin di bolscevizzare l'Europa. L'invincibile macchina di guerra tedesca prepara nelle retrovie una primavera di ferro e di fuoco.

Intervento degli Stati Uniti. A prescindere dal fatto che la Repubblica socialista era ufficialmente in guerra con l'Asse da molto tempo, guerra da cui si riprometteva il dominio del mondo, senza combattere, i primi fatti d'arme nel Pacifico costituiscono per gli Stati Uniti la piu' severa lezione che la storia di quel paese ricordi. La flotta americana del Pacifico si e' rivelata degna soltanto di quelle parate cinematografiche tanto care ai

BANDO

IL GOVERNATORE DEL MONTENEGRO

ha decretato:

In caso di attentati contro personale delle Forze Armate Italiane

I°) per 1 Ufficiale italiano ucciso o ferito saranno fucilati 50 civili.

II°) per 1 sottufficiale o militare di truppa italiano ucciso o ferito saranno fucilati 10 civili.

NOTIZIE VARIE

ROMA: Nel suo discorso in Piazza Venezia il Duce ha detto: „il Tripartito Roma-Berlino-Tokio diventa un'alleanza militare che schiera contro i nemici oltre 250.000.000 di uomini..."

SAN FRANCISCO: La metropoli del Pacifico ha subito il suo primo allarme aereo durato 2 ore. Le navi giapponesi incrociano non lontane dalla costa. Vivissimo e' il panico in tutta la popolazione, che per la prima volta nella storia degli Stati Uniti sente la guerra alle porte di casa.

LONDRA: L'Anmiragliato britannico e' stato costretto ad ammettere l'affondamento al largo della Malacca delle supercorazzate „Prince of Wales" e „Repulse", di 35.000 ton., ad opera dei giapponesi.

La „Prince of Wales", varata nel 1941, era l'orgoglio della Marina britannica perche' considerata la piu' potente nave da battaglia del mondo.

ROMA: Dopo Malta e Gibilterra, mezzi speciali della Marina italiana hanno violato il porto di Alessandria d'Egitto silurando le corazzate „Valiant" e „Barkan".

L'eccezionale impresa ha suscitato in Inghilterra enorme impressione.

pubblici Stalinghesi: sorpresa a Pearl Harbour nelle Hawaii dalle navi giapponesi e' finita quasi totalmente negli abissi di quel mare che a troppo buon mercato aveva creduto di poter dominare. Le Filippine, le isole di Guam, Yap, Borneo, Sumatra, rimaste senza valida difesa, sono preda delle formidabili armate dei figli del Sol Levante. Hong Kong, la penisola di Malacca, e la sua flotta Singapore, sono i tributi che la vorace Inghilterra paga alla povera ma esuberante nazione giapponese. Il bilancio del 1° mese di guerra aereo-navale e' il seguente: 7 navi da battaglia americane e 2 inglesi affondate, 4 danneggiate; 3 cacciatorpediniere americani affondati, 6 danneggiati; 2 cacciatorpediniere affondati, 5 danneggiati; 16 sommergibili affondati e 15 navi di superficie di minor tonnellaggio. Oltre 1000 aerei americani e 200 inglesi sono stati abbattuti o distrutti al suolo.

Questi sono i fatti che, sia pure a denti stretti, gli anglo-sassoni hanno dovuto ammettere: essi soli parlano, essi soli contano, non le insensate fandonie di una propaganda che ha ormai fatto il suo tempo e che si spera, non trovera' piu' gente illusa e disposta a subire e credere supinamente.

Vorremmo che quelli sconsigliati e criminali che ancor oggi congiurano ai danni della parte sana del popolo del Montenegro e Sangiacato, recando morte e distruzione ai loro fratelli e al loro paese, aprissero gli occhi e si ravvedessero, meditando a lungo sui fatti e sulle cifre che abbiamo esposto e che non temono menzogna di sorta.

The following order of General Pirz'o Biroli, Governor of Montenegro, was published in the paper "Notiziario di Plevlje":

In case of an attack against members of the Italian armed forces:

I. 50 civilians will be shot for each Italian officer killed or wounded.

II. 10 civilians will be shot for each N.C.O. or soldier of the Italian army killed or wounded".



Italians shooting hostages in Montenegro.



An Italian soldier (Somewhere in Montenegro) killing hostages who have been shot but are still showing signs of life.

In the middle of June 1942, 95 hostages were shot by order of the Governor. A communication on that matter was published in the paper »Glas Crnogorca«, No. 26, of June 20, 1942.

By the end of June 1943, 180 hostages brought from the concentration camp at Bar were shot the same day in various places of Montenegro by order of the Governor. This was also communicated in »Glas Crnogorca«, № 129 June 26, 1943. 20 hostages were shot that day at Nikšić. The hostages were fired at suddenly from all sides, which is illustrated by the fact that an Italian priest, who had come to attend the execution, was killed on that occasion.

In his communication of September 8, 1943, announcing the shooting of 13 hostages at Kolašin, which was published in No. 148 of »Glas Crnogorca«, General Ercole Poncoglia, who wielded all military power in Montenegro at that time, says:

»Let it be known to all that I am conscious of my duty and that I will fulfill it to the end, and that therefore I will order ever greater reprisals to be taken for every shameful murder of my soldiers«.

The above quoted shootings of hostages in Montenegro are only individual examples of these crimes, systematically perpetrated in Montenegro all throughout the occupation on the basis of general orders of Governor Pirzio Biroli, which we have quoted above.

From the mass of documentary material these are some characteristic examples of orders for shooting of hostages and of their execution. To the right of our people to self-defence, recognized by international conventions, and to the heroic struggle of our people for liberty, the Italian invader opposed that kind of crime also, which is one of the most cruel and revolting because it is directed exclusively against innocent people.

V. THE KILLING OF WAR PRISONERS AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS

The Italians remained consequent to the end in denying the legal character of the NOVJ (the Army of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) though some Italian commanders exchanged partisans for their prisoners and did other conclusive acts by which they de facto recognized the NOVJ as an enemy of equal rights. The main reason should be sought in the fact that the Italians adopted such an attitude in order to be able to perpetrate crimes against the NOVJ. The Italian generals never ceased calling the NOVJ "rebels", "bandits" and such like, because they obviously wanted to deny it the advantages belonging by international laws to a belligerent party, to be able to shoot war prisoners, and above all, to have a pretext for measures of retaliation against the peaceful population because of its alleged participation in banditism.

In fact, it was just these measures of retaliation that the Italian Government set the Italian army of occupation as its war aim. This kind of warfare was considered more efficacious from the military point of view by the Italian generals, who wished to attain great results with small losses, to achieve cheap military successes through inhuman persecution of the families of our fighters and of the

people in general and through the killing of war prisoners and wounded soldiers; thus they thought of achieving easy military successes by means of crimes instead of arms. Their aim was to terrify by crime those who fought against them arms in hand.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE NOVJ THROUGHOUT YUGOSLAVIA WAS REGARDED BY THE ITALIAN COMMAND AS THE SECOND ALLIED FRONT

The denial of the character of a belligerent party to the NOVJ was agreed upon between the Governments and Supreme Commands of Italy and Germany and was transferred to various quisling and other traitorous troops in our country, that assisted the enemy. This can be clearly seen from the complete identity of their procedure. War prisoner Colonel-General Löhr, German commander of the South-East, attested that Hitler personally had ordered NOVJ to be considered an irregular band. He said:

»It has been the habit to use the word »bands« instead of »partisans« in orders, since this was prescribed by the Führer. Orders in that sense were given. In practice this caused confusion, as the word »bands« in professional military terminology meant smaller units waging guerilla war independently and for their own account. As the word »partisans« was forbidden by that order, the practice of calling them Tito's troops was introduced. But the OKW kept to its earlier practice up to the end of the war and mentioned even bandit division in its orders, which, according to professional military terminology is an obvious contradiction«.

We are in possession of written orders according to which the term "communist bands" or "Balkan bolshevist bands" had to be used in all official documents. This was attested also by the Italian captain Panicucci, who was taken prisoner in Montenegro, though there were heaps of Italian documents stating that they knew well that the NOVJ was organized as an army, that the combatants were subordinated to military discipline and organization at the head of which stood officers, that they wore a sign of recognition, that they bore arms openly and respected the laws and usages of war. In their correspondence the Italian generals and their Government confessed more than that. They confessed that there was a real front in Yugoslavia. Thus № 609 of the »Supplemento al Notiziario« says:

»... as the partisan effectives were constantly increasing we were obliged to use more and more of our forces: a real out-and-out front has been created on Balkan soil in favour of the allies«.

This is what General Roatta writes about the struggle imposed by the NOVJ upon the invader in 1942:

»The struggle against the partisans is not a struggle against separate local bands, but against an opponent who aspires at establishing a single front line in place of the Yugoslav Army, which was gloriously dispersed in 1941 by our II Army. The war that is being waged in the Balkans is the same that is being waged in Russia, in East Africa etc.«

Roatta could not be more explicit as regards the character and dimensions of war in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav forces participating in it. Moreover, the Italians regarded it as "the second front". In that context the annex to a draft of a daily report of operations is of interest. This annex shows that former daily reports of operations in Slovenia called it a separate point of operations. Realising that they had thereby made an involuntary confession, the Head-Quarters of the XI Army Corps erased their error. This annex dated August 7, 1942, runs as follows:

... "With regard to the Duce's words denying the existence of the "second front", the name of the army corps bulletin is changed and runs as follows:

"Operation against the communists in Slovenia."

This is what general Pirzio Biroli, Governor of Montenegro, wrote in a memento, which every soldier of his had to carry in his pack:

"If newspapers cannot now write of this front of yours for political reasons, I assure you that Rome looks at you with thrilled and most lively interest. Your sacrifices are known: one day the veil will be removed and everybody will know and realise the portent and importance of the struggle you are waging".

But still the Italians never ceased using crime as a means of struggle against the NOVJ.

ALTHOUGH FULLY AWARE OF THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE NOVJ, THE ITALIANS, IN ORDER TO HAVE A PRETEXT FOR THEIR CRIMES, NEVER RECOGNIZED IT

Before dealing with orders for killing war prisoners, and particular characteristic examples of shootings executed on the basis of these orders, we shall give evidence proving that the Italian authorities were acquainted with objective facts which showed that the NOVJ completely answered to the conditions of a belligerent party, as required by international laws.

In a memorandum annexed to the dispatch № 8415/op without date, which was sent to the Commander of the II Army, probably in connection with the events of November 1941, General Mario Robotti, commander of the XI Army Corps and later commander of the II Army, wrote about the Movement of National Liberation and its army as follows:

"The forms of the insurgent movement.

We may establish easily:

1) The centre of organization which works in Ljubljana and controls the insurgent movement.

It keeps in touch with the leaders of similar movements in Serbia and Croatia... Collects money, arms, garments and distributes them to the armed bands. It has created a national committee which convenes and conducts regular meetings, endeavouring to unite various political parties into a firm block... It has introduced taxes and issued compulsory loans... it publishes a weekly paper in which the decisions of that committee are published... It undermines our national and military prestige.

The board of this organized centre is composed of professors, journalists, students, state and communal officials and bank clerks...

2) Armed bands are created according to the Soviet system of groups of 15—20 men... led by a "commander" (former officer or n. c. officer of the Yugoslav army) and a "political commissar".

They wear military signs on civil dress... Immediately after recruitment they are sent to camp-schools where they get a short (usually 7 days) course of instruction including the handling of arms..."

General Taddeo Orlando, commander of the »Granatieri di Sardegna« division communicated the facts of the formation and strength of the Slovene partisan detachments in his report № 12959 of July 31, 1942, which was sent to subordinate commanders for information and to the Commander of the XI Army Corps.

"From the examination of the partisans who were shot after that, it is evident that:

1) The partisan units were organized in the following manner:

The Notranj regiment, composed at first of 5 battalions to which the sixth was added later on.

The Styria regiment composed of 2 battalions without permanent garrison...



Italian general personally controlling the shooting of captured Yugoslav fighters in Lurah village in Slovenia.

General Gloria, Commander of the V Army Corps, also mentions in his order № 1105 of January 24, 1943, the IV and XIII partisan shock brigade in the Krasić-Sočice zone and four brigades equipped with artillery and mortars in the Ploče zone. In the operations book of General Fabbri we find also the mention of the IV partisan brigade under the date February 28, 1943. Robotti, Commander of the II Army informs all his units (February 23, 1943, No. 5129/8) that the partisans have formed the »Supreme Command of the Partisan Army in Yugoslavia« which has 2 corps, 8 divisions, 24 brigades, and that the command of maritime partisans has been also formed in the Podgora—Makarska zone. Finally the commander of the "Isonzo" division communicates to all the commands under № 98/1825 the contents of the captured circular "The manner of partisan warfare".

The fighters of the NOVJ were marked by a permanent sign of recognition and bore arms publicly. At the beginning our fighters wore the uniform of the old Yugoslav army; later on, after the arrival of large masses of the people, they were marked at least by a cap with a red star badge on it. All this was very well known to the Italian commands. We have cited above the passage from the memorandum of the Commander of the XI Army Corps relating to the wearing of military signs by the partisans. As another proof of it we shall mention the dispatch of the commander of the "Isonzo" division № L. 2(I) of January 31, 1943, giving subordinate commands description and design of the partisan rank badges. Further the dispatch of the same commander № 08/197 of April 1943 describing the signs of the partisan commanders of place, political commissaries etc. There is also the dispatch of the »Lombardia« division № 02/1897 of February 18, 1943, describing the badges of a lieutenant, deputy battalion commander, political commissar etc.

Similar information may be found in the following dispatches: the report of the commander of the division »Cacciatori delle Alpi« No. 5966/op of August 4, 1942, says that among the material and arms captured from the partisans a day before there were uniforms of the Yugoslav army; further, the report of the garrison commander at Semić on the shooting of partisan Stricelj on August 6, 1942, saying that he wore a Yugoslav army cap with tricolour and red star; finally, the report of the commander of the XVII battalion CC. NN. of October 6, 1942 on a fight with the partisan formations of that day, saying that they wore the uniform of the "Serbian army". "I shot one of the prisoners" — added the battalion commander in his report. As can be seen from both these reports the fact that the »rebels« wore Yugoslav uniforms and military signs did not prevent the Italian commanders from shooting the war prisoners.

That the NOVJ troops strictly respected all rules and usages of war must be clear to everybody from the very position of our army. The fact that the NOVJ was weaker than the enemy, both in number and in armaments, that the families of its combatants were in the hands of the invader, that they themselves were always in danger of falling into his hands, are the reasons that made it incumbent upon the Command of the NOVJ to respect international rules and usages of warfare. Among the great number of documents from Italian sources, which are at the disposal of this Commission, there is none affirming that the NOVJ had broken laws of war and humanity.

Finally, the Italians knew very well that the NOVJ was from the outset recognized as a regular army by the USSR, and later on by the other allied countries too. They were aware that allied military missions were present at the Head-Quar-



An Italian soldier searches the pockets of killed patriots in Montenegro.



Italian crimes in Slovenia. — A Fascist N. C. O. exulting over the corpses of killed prisoners.

ters of the NOVJ. We find the names of allied officers of these missions in their dispatches.

We have already pointed out that the Italian commands, though recognizing de facto the NOVJ, refused to the end to recognize it de jure. We could mention many cases of the NOVJ's representatives coming into contact with the representatives of the Italian army for the purpose of concluding agreements usual among belligerent parties — like temporary local cessation of hostilities for the purpose of removing wounded soldiers, burying corpses, exchanging prisoners, etc. We shall mention only those examples which may be proved by the documents of Italian origin.

One of these proofs is the telegram of the Commander of the XI Army Corps of March 23, 1943, communicating the order of the Commander of the II Army to all territorial commands to cease temporarily further shooting of captured fighters of the NOVJ in order to facilitate the exchange of captured Italian soldiers:

"№ 02/1551. — The following order of the Supersloda is communicated to be acted upon: for the purpose of facilitating the salvage of our war prisoners by way of exchange for the partisans now in our hands, the prescriptions now in force are mitigated so that authorisation is given not to shoot captured partisans, but to treat them as war prisoners for the purpose of exchange. This order is of a temporary character and should be acted upon... until further instructions..."

But there were cases of local commanders entering into negotiations even before this authorization. There are proofs of it in the operations book of the V detachment G.A.F. under General Fabbri's command, dated February 8, 1943, which reads as follows:

"The command of the fourth partisan brigade... demands the exchange of 40 Italian prisoners and Captain Feresta, of the V engineering-railway battalion for the same number of interned partisans and a Yugoslav captured officer... I asked authorization from higher authorities in that respect..."

Of similar content is the dispatch of the Commander of the VI Army Corps. № 2312/ op of March 18, 1943, who informed the II Army that he had come into contact with the II Proletarian Brigade for the purpose of exchanging war prisoners.

THE COMMANDER OF THE II ITALIAN ARMY ORDERS SHOOTING OF CAPTURED FIGHTERS OF THE NOVJ, WITHOUT EXCEPTION

Soon after taking up the post of commander of the II Army, General Roatta issued the well known instruction "Circolare 3 C". This circular, the contents of which will be given elsewhere, gave a strict order that the NOVJ troops should be treated as "rebel bands" and that every captured fighter should be shot down.

But this is not all. Apart from what was said in that circular, there existed a secret "Annex B". Roatta mentions it in his dispatch № 7000 of April 7, 1942, explaining to territorial commands some points of the circular in greater detail. In section VI he says:



Italian crimes in Slovenia. — After every struggle, whenever the Italians took a prisoner, they shot him immediately.



Italian soldiers after having shot captured Montenegrin fighters, look at their corpses.



The Italians shot their prisoners. After shooting, an Italian soldier searches the pockets of the victims.



The shooting of the captured partisan Perović and two members of the Jovanović family in the surroundings of Cetinje.

"At the same time the annex 'B' prescribes in greater detail the treatment of the rebels.

These orders — for evident reasons — will not be included in the "Circolare 3 C" but will be communicated to the subordinate division commands (and to those corresponding to them).

To the commands lower than the latter, these orders will be communicated only orally."

With a view to the criminal contents of the »Circolare 3 C« it is easy to imagine the contents of the annex, which "for evident reasons cannot be included in the "circular" and "will be communicated only orally" to brigades and other commands.

Just before the beginning of the great Rog offensive in Slovenia, Grazioli, High Commissioner of the Ljubljana Province, and Robotti, Commander of the XI Army Corps, issued a proclamation to the people ordering the shooting of everybody who would commit an act of hostility towards Italian authorities or troops. Judging by a draft corrected and signed by Roatta himself, relating to the "application of the order of July 15, 1942, we may conclude that the order mentioned above was issued by Roatta himself. Roatta requests that these measures should be applied »without false pity« and adds: **»I do not allow the persons in question to be tried at court or interned; they must be annihilated.«**

THE ITALIAN COMMANDERS COMPETE IN KILLING CAPTURED AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF THE NOVJ

In a telegram dated June 24, 1942, from Kočevje, General Quarra, Commander of the "Macerata" division, informed the Commander of the XI Army Corps, that a patrol had caught 6 partisans and a machine gun in a house and that they would be shot. An officer at the Head-Quarters of the XI Army Corps — probably chief of staff — wrote the following note in the margin:

"Good! if there was no need of examining the captured partisans, it would be better to hear that they were shot on the spot."

This note is quite in the spirit of the conceptions of General Robotti, Commander of the Army Corps, who himself wrote the following note on the same report: *"No! No examination is needed. At worst, one could have been left, and then shot too".*

General Ruggero, division commander, informed Robotti in a telegram of August 4, 1942, No. 5966/op that he had shot one partisan and arrested 10 «suspected» persons as well as 63 inhabitants of Rakitnica village. Robotti wrote in the telegram as follows:

"Gallo, inquire thoroughly into the treatment of the suspected persons, for it seems to me a little too much to be unable to find at least one example among 73 suspected persons. What do the prescriptions of "Circolare 3 C" and other orders subsequently issued say? Conclusion: Too little shooting".

The next day came the telegram of General Fabbri informing Robotti that he had killed 9 partisans in a fight, shot immediately 32 captured partisans and kept

31
COPIA FONOGRAMMA

0-7009 *dt*

DA COMANDO DIVISIONE CACCIATORI
AT COMANDO XI CORPO D'ARMATA
e, per conoscenza:
AT COMANDO DIVISIONE GRANATIERI SARDEGNA
AT COMANDO DIVISIONE MACERATA

BA

Nr. 5966/op.

RIEPILOGO NOVITA' GIORNO 3 CORRENTE.

II BTG. 52° PIR. ESEGUITO RASTRELLAMENTO ZONA TRAVNA GORA (VH-IX).

ZONA RAVAC (VO-CD) ZONA PODGORA (DQ-CD) DA I BTG. 51° PIR. ZONA

LEDENIK (VS-BZ) NESSUNA NOVITA'. BRIGANTI COMUNISTI PASSATI PER ARMI

1. ARRESTATI SOCPATI DI FAVOREGGIAMENTO 10. ARRESTATI 63 ABITANTI RAKO-

WICA PURE SOSPETTI FAVORREGGIAM. NTO. DISTRUTTO UNO ACCAMPAMENTO RIBELLI,

INCENDIATE 5 BARACCHE, RIMOSSE ABBATTUTE, DISTRUTTI POSTI VEDETTA. CATTU-

RATE 2 MITRAGLIATRICI Schvarta lose, 3 FUCILI MITRAGLIATORI, 2 FUCILI,

5 CASSE MUNIZIONI CONTENENTE ANCORA 4376 CARTUCCE, UNA CASSA CON 31 BOMBE

VARIE, 52 ROTOLI DI MICCIA, 51 CHILI DI ESPLOSIVI VARI, 2000 DETONATORI

ULTERIORI 200 METRI DI FILO TELEFONICO, UN BASTO, 7 CAVALLI ET VARI

INDUMENTI UNIFORME JUGOSLAVA

GENERALE RUGGERO

Giunto ore 7,25 del 4/8


*Callo, chiedi bene l'istituzione
dei rivelli, anche se pare che
in 15 minuti, in linea non d
che dopo un'ora, i miei
con danno 6 mine della 3 C
massime? Concludere. Di quelle
tutte per!*



fatto a cura di

alt

The Commander of the "Cacciatori delle Alpi" division, General Vittorio Ruggero by his pronogram of August 4, 1942, informs the Command of the XI Army Corps of his carrying out of "Rastrella-mento" measures at Travna Gora, Ravac, Podgora and Ledenik, 73 persons are arrested under sus- pect of having supported partisans and one person has been shot. This phonogram bears a note of General Mario Robotti himself, Commander of the Army Corps, addressed to his Chief of staff: "Gallo, inquire thoroughly into the treatment of the suspected persons, for it seems to me a little too much to be unable to find at least one example among 73 suspected persons".



General Umberto Fabbri by his phonogram of August 5, 1942, informs the Commander of the XI Army Corps that he had captured and immediately shot 32 partisans and destroyed the villages of Razlozi, Krašicevica, Kovačev Loz and Okrug. General Mario Robotti wrote the following note on the telegram: "Bravo, Fabbri! He surely has no scruples like Ruggero. (The latter should be informed of this by telephone. One can never insist enough with him on this point.)".

40 others for examination. Besides, he had destroyed 4 villages. Robotti wrote the following note on the telegram:

"Bravo Fabbri! He surely has no scruples like Ruggero. (The latter should be informed of this by telephone. One can never insist enough with him on this point.)"

The telegram of general Ruggero with the note of Robotti was circulated in the command before being left in the archives, which can be seen from the notes written on it.

We have purposely introduced here the documents issued by General Robotti in order to give the true picture of that criminal-general, a prototype of Italian commanders in occupied Yugoslavia. He earned great confidence of the Supreme Command and was promoted to the post of Commander of the II Army as the worthiest of Italian generals who would continue the policy of Mario Roatta. We shall cite here some more documents which will show more completely that this high Italian officer was in fact a criminal type in service of an equally criminal government and supreme command.



Četniks at Nikšić shooting Ljubo—Čedo Čupić, law student in the presence of Italians.



Brutal crimes of the Italians: Italians dancing round the corpse of a shot partisan, Nikola Đurković, at Herzeg—Novi January 31, 1943.

CRIMINAL ORDERS FOR KILLING WAR PRISONERS WERE ISSUED UP TO THE LAST MOMENT

The next general order of Italian commanders relating to the treatment of captured fighters of the NOVJ was dated March 23, 1943. It proceeded from the Commander of the II Army — who is now Mario Robotti. Its contents have been quoted above; it attenuates the order about the shooting of captured soldiers of the NOVJ without exception for the purpose of exchange for captured Italian soldiers.

But this attenuation did not last long. Already in May of the same year General Robotti issued the order which we find repeated in the dispatch of the Command of the XI Army Corps No. 02/2493 of May 27, 1943.

"With a view to an alteration of the order of the Supreme Command, № 02/1551 of March 23, 1943, relating to the treatment of captured rebels and by authority of the same command, I order the following:

1) All rebels captured in Slovenia should be shot, whatever nationality they belonged to.

2) The rebels captured in Croatia:

a) should be shot if they are of Slovene or Italian nationality.

b) If they are of some other nationality, they may be shot or kept for exchange, according to the view of the commander...

Shooting... will be executed immediately after examination, or, in cases where subsequent examinations prove to be necessary, at latest within 48 hours after capture."

When in the summer of 1943, military defeat of Italy became evident to everybody and when some Italian commanders, fearing the responsibility for their crimes, attenuated the treatment of the population and of the captured soldiers of the NOVJ, Mario Robotti issued the following order on August 23, 1943, a few days only before the capitulation of Italy:

No. 111780/AC.

"...My telegram No. 3581/AC of March 21, 1943, aimed at facilitating the salvage of our war prisoners from partisan bands, authorized you to leave alive captured partisans... in order to gather a certain number of them for exchange.

Though I don't intend to revoke this order, I wish to point out that that authorization must not be interpreted in the sense of renouncing the shooting of all war prisoners.

Shooting remains a rule. The authorization to leave a war prisoner alive is only an exception.

I order, therefore, that every decision not to shoot a captured partisan should be communicated to the Army Command; the motive for not shooting a captured partisan should be mentioned together with his particulars.

A confirmation that this order has been communicated to all subordinate units should be sent to me".

0-1505

COMANDO XI° CORPO D' ARMATA - UFFICIO OPERAZIONI

N. 02/2493 di pret.ep. P.M. 46 - 27 maggio 1943-III.

SUBGETTO: Trattamento ribelli catturati in combattimento.

INDIRIZZI OMNESI

A modifica delle disposizioni emanate dal Comando Superiore - disposte siano trasmesse con fono n. 02/1551 ep. del 23 marzo u.s. - riguardanti il trattamento dei ribelli catturati in combattimento, dietro autorizzazione delle stesse Comande, dispense:

- 1°) Tutti i ribelli catturati in Slovenia e a qualsiasi nazionalità essi appartengano siano passati per le armi.
- 2°) I ribelli catturati in Croazia:
 - a) - se di nazionalità Slovena e Italiana siano passati per le armi;
 - b) - se di altra nazionalità siano passati per le armi e tenuti a disposizione per comandi prigionieri, ad arbitrio del comandante Divisione Lombardia e dei comandanti di G.O. eventualmente operanti in Croazia;
- 3°) L'esecuzione - in linea di massima - dovrà avvenire subito dopo l'interrogatorio e comunque non oltre le 48 ore dalla cattura, nel caso sia reputata necessaria procedere a ulteriore interrogatorio;
- 4°) I ribelli che non sono stati passati per le armi in virtù delle disposizioni di cui al tele citate - e per i quali non sia già stata effettuata la denuncia - siano denunciati al Tribunale Militare di Guerra della 2° Armata - Sezione di Lubiana.

Seguiranno norme definitive - in corso di compilazione - per i ribelli spontaneamente costituiti.

IL GENERALE DI CORPO D' ARMATA COMANDANTE
- Gastone Gambara -

COMANDO DELLA DIVISIONE FANTERIA "ISONZO" (14°)
Ufficio del capo di ...-sezione ep. e servizi

N. 02/3698 di pret.ep. P.M. 59 - 29 maggio 1943-III.

AL COMANDO 23° FANTERIA
AL COMANDO 24° FANTERIA
AL COMANDO 50° LEG. C.N.
AL COMANDO 6° ARTIGL.

e, per conoscenza:

AL COMANDO 3° DIVISIONALE
AL COMANDO 4° DIVISIONALE
AL COMANDO 14° DIV. ARTIGL.
AL COMANDO 15° DIV. ARTIGL.
AL COMANDO 16° DIV. ARTIGL.
AL COMANDO 17° DIV. ARTIGL.
AL COMANDO 18° DIV. ARTIGL.
AL COMANDO 19° DIV. ARTIGL.

... per l'ottenimento, a seguito foglio 02/1016 ep. del 23/3/1943, la cattura e la destinazione dei G.O. catturati sarà comunicata ai solleciti operanti in tal senso.

D'ordine
IL 1° M. COL. CAPO DI S.M.
- M. Rossi -

c. o.
SEZIONE

1° M. COL. CAPO DI S.M.
- M. Rossi -

Order of the Commander of the II Army, General Mario Robotti, mentioned in an order of the Command of the XI Army Corps. Speaking of the shooting of prisoners this document contains also the following words:

1) All rebels captured in Slovenia should be shot, whatever nationality they belong to.

2) The rebels captured in Croatia:

a) should be shot if they are of Slovene or Italian nationality.

... if they are of some other nationality, they may be shot or kept for exchange, according to the view of the commander...

COMANDO ARMA - Uff. AFFARI CIVILI -

N.11780/AC. P.M.10 - 23 agosto 1943

OGGETTO : Trattamento ai ribelli catturati armati.-

.....INDIRIZZI.....

Con telescritto n.2553/AC. indirizzato al VI Corpo d'Armata, in data 3 marzo 1943, comunicato il giorno 10 marzo seguente al XVIII Corpo d'Armata con telescritto 2865/AC. e successivamente portato a notizia anche ai corpi d'armata V e XI con telescritto 3381/AC. del 21 marzo, allo scopo di aiutare il ricupero dei nostri prigionieri in mano ai partigiani, autorizzavo che, in attuazione delle disposizioni vigenti, fossero mantenuti in vita, anziché senz'altro passati per le armi, i partigiani catturati armati in combattimento, per poterne costituire un nucleo del quale servirsi per eventuali scambi.-

Non intendo revocare questa mia disposizione, tuttavia desidero chiarire che l'autorizzazione da me concessa in relazione alle speciali contingenze del momento, non deve essere interpretata nel senso che si debba rinunciare al passaggio per le armi di tutti i catturati.-

Questa del passaggio per le armi è e rimane la regola. La facoltà concessa di mantenerli in vita costituisce una eccezione, la cui applicazione è lasciata alla discrezione dei singoli comandi che potranno avvalersene, e non, a seconda di quanto potrà apparire necessario di fronte al numero dei prigionieri nostri in mani partigiane e le probabilità di effettuare scambi.-

Comunque, dispongo, che ogni volta che si venga nella determinazione di mantenere in vita un partigiano catturato armato, se venga formato il Comando d'Armata, comunicando, oltre alle generalità del catturato, anche il motivo specifico per il quale si è ritenuto di non procedere al suo passaggio per le armi.-

Gradirò essere assicurato che questa mia disposizione è stata portata a conoscenza di tutti i reparti dipendenti.-

IL GENERALE C/TE DESIGNATO D'ARMATA
- F/to : Mario ROBOTTI -

Cv. COLANDO DELLA DIVISIONE DI FANTERIA "VISONO" (14°)
- Ufficio del Capo di S.M. - S.M. Op. e Servizi -

N.02/5984 di prot.OP. P.M. 5 - 24 agosto 1943

ORIGINALE

AL COLANDO FANTERIA DIV/II)
AL COLANDO DEL 23° FANTERIA)
AL COLANDO DEL 24° FANTERIA)
AL COLANDO 98° LEGIONE LVSN)
AL COLANDO 6° ARTIGLIERIA)
AL COLANDO DIVO BTO. MONTI)
AL COLANDO DEI SOCCORRI DIV/II)
ALLA SEZIONE "INTELLIGENZA")

.....per conoscenza e norma.-

d'ordine
MATER. COL. CAPO DI S.M.
- G. Carli -

On August 23, 1943, — a few days before the capitulation of Italy — the Commander of the II. Army, General Mario Robotti, issued an order to his subordinate commanders speaking of the application of a former order on the treatment of captured partisans. The order contains also the following sentences: "Shooting remains a rule. The authorization to leave a war prisoner alive is given only as an exception..."

FOTOGRAMMA A MANO

DA COMANDO L'ANTERLA CACCIATORI

➔ AT COMANDO XI CORPO D'ARMATA

e, per conoscenza

AT COMANDO TATTICO DIVISIONE CACCIATORI

N° 2148/OP (.) ATTIVITA' OPERATIVA GIORNO 17 (.)

REPARTO PRESIDIO GROBUPOLJE ESEGUITA PUNTATA AT KRIZKA VAS
(VO-CZ) (.) VERBATO UN SOSPETTO (.) REPARTO PRESIDIO SMARJE
ELETUATA PUNTATA ZONA GLOBUSCEK - PUCHAR (US-DE-CZ) (.)
NESSUNA NOVITA' (.) REPARTO PRESIDIO DOBROPOLJE CON CONCORSO
PRESIDIO CUSPEK RASTRELLATA ZONA LLOVA GORA (VO-CS) (.)
RECUPERATI UN UCILE ET UNA CARICA MITRAGLIATORE (.) REPARTO
PRESIDIO KOPANJ CON CONCORSO PRESIDIO SLIVNICA RASTRELLATA
ZONA NA BOLI (VM-MU) (.) NESSUNA NOVITA' (.) REPARTO PRESIDIO
V.LABCE ESEGUITA PUNTATA ZONA KRKOVO (US-CO) (.) NESSUNA NOVI-
TA' (.) PRESIDIO VIDEL - KRKA ELETUATO RASTRELLAMENTO ZONA
OVEST ROTABILE IER STIONA (.) RECUPERATI UN UCILE ET MUNISIO-
NI (.) REPARTO PRESIDIO STIONA COMPIUTO RASTRELLAMENTO ZONA
BOJANJI VEH (VS-CU) (.) NESSUNA NOVITA' (.) PRESIDIO S.VID
CON CONCORSO FORMAZIONE M.V.A.C. RASTRELLATA ZONA NORD TEMENI-
CA (ZI-DE) (.) UN PRIGIUNO E UN'ESCA UCCISO IN COMBATTIMENTO
(.) TRE CATTURATI (.) RECUPERATI QUATTRO UCILI (.) UN MOSCHET-
TO (.) 230 CARTUCCE (.) TRE BORSE A MATO ALT 21001709

La zona è
una po' a sud
di Poljane
dove in loco
facendo l'anno
naumane -



GENERALE MAGGIORE


- Alt

3 catturati sono stati preparati
per la morte - ma lo disano subito subito!
18-12-44

On the report of General Maggiore that the Commander of the "Cacciatori delle Alpi" division has captured three partisans, the Commander of the XI Army Corps Mario Robotti wrote:

"Prisoners! What does that mean? If they are rebels, they must be shot!"

When subsequently it had been noted on the same document that the prisoners had been shot, General Robotti wrote: "By Jove, they should have told me that immediately!"



The High Commissioner for the Ljubljana province, Emilio Grazioli, informs the Commissaries of the districts: "All persons with whom are found communist or similar leaflets must be shot. The buildings in which the mentioned documents are discovered must be destroyed".


MARCONIGRAMMA CIFRATO

P.M.40. 17 giugno 1942/XI

DA COMANDO XI CORPO ARMATA
AT COMANDO DIVISIONE FANTERIA MACERATA

02/5360 ALT ESPRIMO MIO COMPIACIMENTO PER ATTIVITA' OPERATIVA
DIPENDENTI REPARTI ALT CONTINUATELA ET ESTENDITELA
ANCHE IN ZONA RIBERICA ALT RACCOMANDO DECISIONE NELLA
AZIONE SUD COCEVIANO PERCHE' MI INTERESSA PORTARE
AL PIU' PRESTO A COCEVIE IL BATTAGLIONE DEL 23° ORA AT
PETRINA ALT RIBELLI CATTURATI SIANO PASSATI PER LE
ARMI ALT

10 70
= GENERALE ROBOTTI



The telegram of June 17, 1942, of the Commander of the XI Army Corps, General Mario Robotti, to the Command of the "Macerata" infantry division ordering the shooting of captured NOVJ fighters.



A joint crime of the Italians and Draža Mihajlović's četniks: the četniks had captured and the Italians hung the partisan Jelena Baletić, at Nikšić.



The partisan, Jelena Baletić, before her hanging.



The Italian criminal after having killed a girl.

THE KILLING OF WOUNDED WAR PRISONERS

Up to September 1942, at least in the orders of the highest Italian commanders in Yugoslavia some difference had been made between healthy and wounded fighters of the NOVJ, who fell into the hands of the Italian Army. While the former had to be shot immediately, the latter, according to these orders, had to be handed on to the tribunals (the order of the Commander of the II Army No. 02/6029 of July 2, 1942). The reports of the troop commanders of the Italian Army from that period show that some — but only a few — commanders kept to that order. Meanwhile, after the Velebit offensive (September 1942) there was no trace of it; after that time wounded captured partisans were not mentioned in any report whatsoever. Only a laconic note »they are shot« was put by the figure showing the total number of war prisoners.

The wounded and the sick, captured in the hospitals of the NOVJ, were also shot. Thus for example, all wounded soldiers of the Jelenov Žljeb hospital in Slovenia were brutally killed.

General Fabbri, Commander of the group of G.A.F. wrote in the operations book for January—February 1943, under the date of February 15, that:

"... a partisan hospital at Cinj—Potok has been burnt down".

After the perusal of these orders for killing war prisoners and wounded soldiers, issued by the highest Italian military commands in occupied Yugoslavia, it will be easier to understand the number of crimes committed by Italian troops against our fighters, who fell into their hands. According to the evidence gathered up till now, this number amounts to about 10,000. We have already mentioned above that only a part of the archives of the Italian Head-Quarters is in our hands, mainly parts of the archives of the XI Army Corps and some reports of the V army corps. But even the evidence relating to this smaller part of the Italian military forces in Yugoslavia is far from being complete, as we dispose only of a smaller part of the archives of the XI Army Corps and only of several reports of the V Army Corps sent to the XI Army Corps during their joint action in the Fourth offensive. Thus for example, complete reports on killed war prisoners during incessant smaller fights up to the Rog offensive (July 1942) as well as the reports after September 1942, are lacking in the XI Army Corps archives. According to a complete report on the number of killed partisans during the first 20 days of the Rog offensive (dated August 7, 1942) the XI Army Corps had shot 478 captured partisans during that period. In the report for the period August 6—21, 1943, it is stated that 260 captured partisans had been shot. No such reports of the XI and V Army Corps during the fourth offensive are available. The report of the V Army Corps No. 1189/op of January 24, 1943, relating to the events of January 23, says that 202 captured partisans had been killed on that day only. Thus, according to the evidence contained in the three above mentioned reports, for the period July 15 — August 21, 1942, (during less than a month and a half) and on January 23, 1943, 940 captured soldiers of the NOVJ were killed on the territory of the XI and V Army Corps.

According to other separate reports of the commands under the XI Army Corps — which we repeat are incomplete — the number of shot soldiers of the NOVJ amounts to 307 more.

The Italian documentary evidence of the XVIII, XIV and VI Army Corps relating to the killing of wounded and captured soldiers is not dealt with in this report in order not to go into too many details.

A great number of telegraphic reports on daily operations from all divisions operating in Yugoslavia has been found in the captured archives as well as the reports of another character, constantly repeating the formula: »Shot (1, 2, 3, 5, 10) war prisoners«. It is evident from this documentary material that the killing of war prisoners, this war crime, was being committed by the Italian Army as a generally accepted and recognized law of warfare.

7525



COMANDO XVIII CORPO D'ARMATA

Ufficio I

SEGRETO

Risposta al foglio del P. M. 118 194 Anno
 Div. Sez. N. Al GOVERNO DELLA DALMAZIA
 Prot. N. 33 / I Allegati - Gabinetto Militare -
Z A R A

OGGETTO: Individuazione ribelli.-

3304 M
28-6-42 XI

Si trasmette per conoscenza l'elenco dei
 ribelli di origine dalmata catturati e passa-
 ti per le armi nel territorio della Divisione
 "Sassari" durante il mese di maggio u.s.-

d'ordine
 IL COMANDANTE CAPO DI S.M.
 Pietro Barbato

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Dr. kom.
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 43

The Command of the XVIII Army Corps submits a list of captured and shot "rebels", natives of Dalmatia shot in the course of the month of May 1942 on the territory of the "Sassari" division.
 (See p. 84)

COMANDO DEL XVIII CORPO D'ARMATA
Ufficio Informazioni

Inv. B.

3865

COGNOME E NOME	Nazionalità e religione	Località della cattura	Catturato il	Passato per le armi il
VULELIA Mile	cattolico	Cerovac (DX-Q)	14/5/1942	14/5/1942
VUKAVICA Miljos	"	"	"	"
BABARE Antonio	"	"	"	"
JURICEV Drago	"	Jabukovac (DX-QM)	12/5/1942	"
PASCO Marija	"	"	"	"
TOMIC Vlade	"	"	"	"
BAUS Ante	"	"	"	"
DRAGANIC Nikola	ortodosso	"	"	"
VLAROV Vergil	"	"	"	"
PAVIC Tome	cattolico	"	"	"
PASCO Ante	"	"	"	"
UKIC Ante	"	"	"	"
BIJUSIC Sime	"	"	"	"
TERBICA Milos	ortodosso	"	"	"
PAMUCAR Bogdan	"	"	"	"
ERNJAK Milos	"	"	"	"
LALIS Toma	"	"	"	"
BESBRADICA Marko	"	"	"	"
POPOV Jakob	cattolico	"	"	"
BESBRADICA Mirko	ortodosso	"	"	"
DRLJIAN Ilija	"	"	"	"
ZIGIC iso	"	"	"	"
MILJEVIC Luka	"	Grab (EH-QN)	13/5/1942	"

Tutti i predetti sono stati sottoposti ad interrogatorio. La maggior parte sono contadini e pescatori. Sono quasi tutti provenienti da Zaravecchia - Bettina (Isola Morder) - Vodice (CK-TN) - Saporine (Isola Provicchio).-

*Copia al
V. C. Proletta*